With the end of the Cold War a new political geography emerged. On the main, it "reinvented" the geographical division of Europe into "Western", "Central" and "Eastern". The so-called "States in transition" of the post-1989 period (political transition – meaning the evolution towards democracy and the rule of law, as well as the consolidation of the civil society; economic transition – meaning the implementation of a functional market economy; geostrategic transition – meaning the orientation towards new systems of regional alliances) were in fact the Central and Eastern European States, former members of the Soviet block.

After 2002 - this is after the decisions taken by the Atlantic Council in Prague and the European Council in Copenhagen - the states in transition have become those that it is not expected to have the chance of being integrated in the European Union before 2007.

From a historical point of view, of its cultural and religious background, the area belongs to Europe. Together with Bulgaria, Greece and European Turkey, it is, stricto sensu, the southern (southeastern) extension of Central Europe. Only the inter-ethnic conflicts, the national rivalries after the Cold War have diverted the area from the direction Central Europe has followed: integration into NATO and the European Union. Therefore, the future of the states in the region is towards integration into the North-Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. In order to arrive there one needs to abandon the national jealousies, to grow up the political elites, to consolidate the market economy and to establish the rule of law.

The entire area must face an important challenge: the modernization of the society’s state organization whereas the clan traditions of many ethnic and cultural communities in the region (especially the Albanians) do not favor the respect for the institutions of the civic and multicultural state, or lead to the disintegration of states in practically "city-states" (as is the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina).

A possible social-democratic strategy meant to allow the transformation of the Western Balkans into a peace, stability and security area, as well as to open the way for their integration into the European Union, could be conceived along the following lines:

1. The transformation of the traditional societal organization based on the family’s (clan’s) relationship into a modern type national society organization, skipping the stage of the ethnically based nation-state stage directly to the level of the civic multicultural state;
2. The mobilization of resources for funding:

• the projects that can consolidate the civic nations in the region,
• the common projects aiming at the regional development;

3. The support for

• the development of the civil society in each state of the region and at the level of the entire region,
• the development of the middle class in each of the region’s countries,
• the growth in the general level of education in the region’s countries,
• the cultural polycentrism and the multicultural education;

4. The promotion of programs and actions meant to increase trust between different ethnic and cultural communities in the region.

Recently, the secular Turkey of Kemal Ataturk chose to be governed by an Islamic party. This fact put in light a founding contradiction of the modern Turkish state: the army has modernized the society and the state organization, the military are the guardians of the civil state, but through Kemalism the Turks have separated modernity from democracy and pluralism from liberty. Thus, a vicious circle was entered where Kemalism strengthens, in the name of modernity (based on military democracy and civil authoritarianism) the religious exclusivism, and the latter, in the name of democracy (that is, of pluralism and tolerance opposed to the religious fundamentalism) nourishes the power of the army over the society.

The experience of the 20^th century clearly showed only the force of democracy could counteract that fundamentalism. Therefore, the fundamentalist Islam must be counteracted by opening the Islam towards modernity (thus taking advantage of its genuine capacity of synthesizing faith and tolerance, principles and pragmatism, tradition and modernization at the global level). In conclusion, Turkey must internalize the fundamental principles of the democratic political systems. The historical stake is to demonstrate that there is no incompatibility between Islam and democracy. At that point, any objection regarding the Turkey’s place in the community of values that is the European Union will become unfounded.

The Caucasus (more specifically, Transcaucasia or South Caucasus, region including Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) is a meeting area of different cultural identities (some closer to Europe, some closer to Eurasia), as well as between different strategic interests (European, Eurasian and Euro-Atlantic). This cultural and geopolitical combination will be decisive for the role of the region’s countries and of the region overall, within the global order.

If the integration of the entire Transcaucasia either in the EU or in the CIS would be achieved by a precipitated, almost forced, decision (thus ignoring the objective vocation of the respective countries and/or their subjective options) this might endanger some geostrategic balances. On the other hand, the division of Transcaucasia between (united) Europe and Eurasia (CIS), that is placing the countries in the region under different security umbrellas and in different geopolitical contexts (for example, Georgia and, eventually, Armenia, in the EU, and Azerbaijan in the CIS or a Caspian confederation, or Georgia and Azerbaijan in NATO, and Armenia in the CIS) could favor the escalation of the conflicts among them. Therefore, it is possible and desirable that, in spite of the conflicts and crises that divide them at present, the states in the area ultimately reach the conclusion of forming a Commonwealth of the Transcaucasian States. The latter could play more than the role of a buffer zone. That is the role of an aggregating component of the great European, Eurasian and Euro-Atlantic systems, whose vital interests encounter in the Caucasus.

In the center of Eurasia, the space between the European Union, which is in an unprecedented process of enlargement, and China, which is evolving towards regional and global supremacy, is in danger of remaining a geopolitical black hole until Russia solves its internal controversies about defining its post-imperial status.

Traditionally, in the last centuries, Russia had two great problems: a) the permanent alienation between society and government, between social and political realms; b) the mentality of a fortress under siege, the idea that its security is greater as its neighbors are weaker and unsafe. Surpassing these two problems is essential both for Russia’s very destiny as well as for its relation with the world, that is, to configure its future role in the context of globalization. The Russian political elite must be conscious that Russia’s top priority is its own modernization, rather than the effort to regain its world power status.

Russia’s role in insuring international stability is very important in the fields of:

• The control over mass-destruction weapons (nuclear, chemical or bacteriologic) as well as over their production technology.
• The fight against organized crime, drugs and human beings trafficking.
• The ever-greater phenomenon of international migration, already reaching tens of millions, which entails the risk of ethnic and social conflicts transcontinental spread. Russia must not be turned, though, in a stronghold of the European Christendom to protect through Orthodoxy, western Catholicism and Protestantism against the Islam. On the contrary, it should be a bridge between Asian Islam and European Christianity.

In a globalized world Russia would be not only a "buffer-zone" for the Asian origin migration, but also a distinct source of emigration. Taking into account the fact that the fertility rate in Russia is bigger than in Western and Central Europe, as well as that the level of education in Russia is high, it can be anticipated that this country will play an important part in the achievement of the demographic balances in the European and Eurasian areas.

The vanishing of the Soviet Union’s imperial structure left Central Asia and the Caucasus with a power vacuum. Russia is too weak to regain its imperial domination over the region, but is strong enough not to be excluded. Turkey and Iran are powerful enough to be influential, but their internal political vulnerabilities makes them unfit to deal with Russian challenges and the internal conflicts in the region. China is powerful enough to be a major actor in the area, but is still in search for a global identity. To insure geopolitical stability, this situation calls for the design of a balance of power mechanism between Russia, Turkey, Iran and China, in order to deal with the regional problems under the principle "neither domination, nor exclusion".

In a globalized world Russia will have – due to its geographical setting along some great energy resources routes as well as its rich reserves of hydrocarbons and basic products – a role of a regulating factor in insuring the balance on the oil, natural gas and other strategic products’ market, as well as in insuring the world’s energy security (including the diversification of the sources and transportation means).

One must also think to the massive Russian capital exports in the European Union and USA. This is the aggregated result of the transformation – in a licit but also in an illicit way – of the old overcapitalized Soviet type industry in liquidities, through the post-Soviet privatization process, as well as of the need to invest in secure places the income resulted from the massive selling of the Russian’s important natural resources.

The United States and the European Union have to cooperate with all the regional actors so that none could get the role of a hegemon, as well as in order to guarantee the free access to the region’s energy resources.

The threat for Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova is to remain political and economic "dangerous neighbors". For the time being these two states are potential spreaders of asymmetric risks (organized crime, emigration).

The consolidation of a sovereign Ukraine, defining itself as a Central European state and at the same time engaging in a closer cooperation with the European Union, is a necessity for the insurance of a geopolitical pluralism in Eurasia.

The Republic of Moldova must consolidate its state independence in respect of the Russian Federation; develop the institutions and mechanisms of free market economy; make human rights and fundamental liberties respected by everybody. The goal of all these should be to develop the possibility of Moldova’s integration into the European Union to which it belongs.

The European Union’s challenge towards Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova is to turn the conventional NO regarding the beginning of the accession negotiations, into a YES in principle. Thus, the Union will further prevent conflicts and insure internal stability at its future borders.

Belarus is a special case mainly for two reasons: a) the authoritarian type of Lukashenko’s political regime, and b) the close relations with the Russian Federation. Even though there are no serious risks of ethnic conflicts in Belarus, the EU enlargement towards the east, makes the Minsk regime a dangerous neighbor. The hardship in the relation with Belarus arises not only from the dictatorial character of the Lukashenko regime, but also because Belarus is completely isolated in the international relations. Filling this strategic vacuum is a necessity, in order to use the chances of Belarus’ Europeanization, which are presently ignored. The support for an emerging democratic opposition and the consolidation of the civil society in Belarus are parts of a much needed strategy in this respect.

(The Role of the Ex-Soviet, Balkan and Caucasus States in the Globalization Process)

The concept of states in transition entered the international political vocabulary and is frequently used to make reference to the countries of the former "Communist Block", countries that, during the Cold War, were designated by a geographical term with political connotations, that is "Eastern Europe". The transformations taking place after the fall of the bipolar world system brought important changes of geography through politics. Thus, the geographical division of Europe into "Western Europe", "Central Europe" and "Eastern Europe" was "reinvented". Although the borders of these three branches of the Great Europe are still vague, they are, nonetheless, sufficiently explicit to transform the Balkans (Eastern and Western parts) into a southern peninsula of Central Europe. Consequently, the real South-Eastern Europe is, nowadays, the Caucasus. At the same time, countries situated in the inner part of the continent and close to its eastern border became, through NATO enlargement, Atlantic countries. The Euro-Atlantic world thus stretches from San Francisco (on the Pacific seashore) to Constanţa (on the Black Sea seashore). On the other hand, the reborn "Central Europe" includes states that were a part of the "Soviet Block" (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia) but also states that, after World War II, were a part of the "Atlantic Block" (Germany, Austria, Italy).

In this political and geographic context, the definition of the "states in transition" concept is most imperative. As the entire world is in transition from the bipolar division/separation system to the multi-polar solidarity/globalization system (transition regarding democracy, inter-cultural coexistence, family, nation, state, regional integration and inter-regional cooperation – within another transition, from national to international – etc.), what in the period between 1989 and 2002 we called "states in transition" was the group of countries in Central and Eastern Europe that were turning from dictatorship to democracy and from command economy to market economy.

Within such a process of change, after 2002, especially after the decisions taken by the Atlantic Summit in Prague and the European Summit in Copenhagen, a series of subdivisions can be made. Thus, the states that have the perspective of becoming members of the European Union until 2007 could make up a first group. These states are in "post-transition". This means that they are democracies but their democratic systems are not fully consolidated, ordered, positive and rational. They also benefit of a market economy, but that is not completely functional and is not spared by the negative influences of primitive capital accumulations and corruption (usually associated to any transition process). "Post-transition" is, therefore, the stage of coming to normality and modernity through the transformation of anarchic democracy into positive democracy and of primitive market economy into a functional market economy. On this way, some are more advanced (the ten states that will accede to the EU in 2004) and others are more backward (the two states esteemed to accede to the EU in 2007). All of them, however, will have, in the context of globalization, an integrated role in the role of the united Europe.

A second group is made of the states that are in different evolution stages of the "properly called transition". This group could also be divided into states with a European vocation (Western Balkans, Republic of Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine), states with a Euro-Atlantic vocation (especially Turkey, but also, Georgia and Armenia) and states with a Eurasian vocation (Russia and the former Soviet republics in Central Asia).

The states in transition (political transition – towards democracy and the rule of law, the consolidation of the civil society; economic transition – towards functional market economy; geostrategic transition – towards new regional alliances systems) are those that do not have chances or it is not expected of being integrated in the European Union until 2007. Neither this second group is homogeneous, though.

The hereby-analyzed space can also be divided according to the historical traditions, political and economic conditions, as well as their geostrategic role into: Western Balkans (Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Albania and, eventually, Croatia); Turkey and the Caucasus; the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) with special emphasis on Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus. Each area is, in its turn, culturally, politically and ethnically heterogeneous.

From a historical point of view, of its cultural and religious background, the area belongs to Europe. Together with Bulgaria, Greece and European Turkey it is, stricto sensu, the southern (southeastern) extension of Central Europe. Only the inter-ethnic conflicts and the national rivalries after the Cold War have diverted the area from the direction Central Europe has followed: integration into NATO and the European Union. Therefore, the future of the states in the region is towards integration into the North-Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. In order to get there giving up the national jealousies, growing up of the political elites, consolidation of the market economy and the rule of law establishment are needed.

There are two major risks in the economic development of the region, part of which are already in place: international aid dependence and criminalization of the economy. The national economies there are dependent on external support and the international presence. At the same time, a part of the political and economic elites is not interested in the optimal transformation of the economy, in order to benefit from the underground economy. (This reality fuelled, among others, the violence in Macedonia at the beginning of 2001.)

These risks are accompanied by a great challenge: the modernization of the society’s state organization whereas the clan traditions of many ethnic and cultural communities in the region (especially the Albanians) do not favor the respect for the institutions of the civic and multicultural state, or lead to the disintegration of states in real "city-states" (as is the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina). Such a process of state consolidation and modernization must take place simultaneously with the process of subregional and continental integration.

A possible social-democratic strategy meant to allow the transformation of the Western Balkans into a peace, stability and security area, as well as to pave the way for their integration into the European Union, could be conceived according to the following points:

i. The transformation of the traditional society organization based on family (clan) into a modern type of national society organization, skipping from the stage of the nation state founded according to the ethnic principle and going directly to the level of the civic multicultural state;

ii. The organization of dialogue and debate forums of all the communities living on the territory of different states but having a common ethnic and cultural origin, in order to make them understand, at the same time, what they have in common as a cultural nation, as well as the fact that each of them has many and important specific features that separates their interests and destinies, so that they have only to benefit from the integration in the political order of the states whose citizens they are;

iii. The mobilization of resources for funding:

a) the projects that can consolidate the civic nations (states) in the region,

b) the common projects aiming at the regional development;

iv. The support for

a) the development of the civil society in each state of the region and at the level of the entire region,

b) the development of the middle class in each of the region’s countries,

c) the growth in the general level of education in the region’s countries,

d) the cultural polycentrism and the multicultural education;

v. The promotion of programs and actions meant to increase trust between different ethnic and cultural communities in the region.

Recently, the secular Turkey of Kemal Ataturk chose to be governed by an Islamic party. This fact put in light on a founding contradiction of the modern Turkish state: the army has modernized the society and the state organization, the military are the guardians of the civil state, but through Kemalism the Turks have separated modernity from democracy and pluralism from liberty. Consequently, even if Kemalism modernized the Turkish society it could not democratize it as well; even if it designed more pluralist structures, it did not provide for the citizen’s freedom to create and willingly choose them. Thus, a vicious circle was entered where Kemalism strengthens, in the name of modernity (based on military democracy and civil authoritarianism) the religious exclusivism, and the latter, in the name of democracy (that is, of pluralism and tolerance opposed to the fundamentalism of faith) nourishes the power of the army over the society.

The experience of the 20^th century clearly showed that fundamentalism can be counteracted only by the force of democracy, therefore the fundamentalist Islam must be counteracted by opening the Islam towards modernity (thus taking advantage of its genuine capacity of synthesizing faith and tolerance, principles and pragmatism, tradition and modernization at the global level). In conclusion, Turkey must internalize the fundamental principles of the democratic political systems. The historical stake is to demonstrate that there is no incompatibility between Islam and democracy. At that point any objection regarding the Turkey’s place in the community of values that is the European Union will become unfounded.

Turkey has also an important role in dealing with the Southern Caucasus, with its important energy resources, as well as in establishing a specific bridge between the Euro-Atlantic world and the Turkic countries of central Asia.

In what concerns the Caucasus (more specifically, Transcaucasia or South Caucasus, region including Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) it is worth mentioning it is a meeting area of different cultural identities (some closer to Europe, some closer to Eurasia), as well as of different strategic interests (European, Eurasian and Euro-Atlantic). This cultural and geopolitical combination will be decisive for the role of the region’s countries and of the region overall, within the global order.

If the integration of the entire Transcaucasia either in the EU or in the CIS would be achieved by a precipitated, almost forced, decision (thus ignoring the objective vocation of the respective countries and/or their subjective options) this might endanger some geostrategic balances. Moreover, an authentic integration of Georgia and Azerbaijan into the CIS, supposes especially the building or reconstruction of the confidence between them and the Russian Federation, which will inevitably require the passing of a large period of time.

On the other hand, the division of Transcaucasia between (united) Europe and Eurasia (CIS), that is placing the countries in the region under different security umbrellas and in different geopolitical contexts (for example, Georgia and, eventually, Armenia, in the EU, and Azerbaijan in the CIS or a Caspian confederation, or Georgia and Azerbaijan in NATO, and Armenia in the CIS) could favor the escalation of the conflicts among them.

Therefore, it is possible and desirable that, in spite of the conflicts and crises that divide them at present, the states in the area ultimately reach the conclusion of forming a Commonwealth of the Transcaucasian States, which would probably be the best solution. The latter could play more than the role of a buffer zone. That is the role of an aggregating component of the great European, Eurasian and Euro-Atlantic systems, whose vital interests encounter in the Caucasus. The establishment of such a Transcaucasian Commonwealth implies, though, the preceding settlement of the conflicts of interests and defining a strategic cooperation system in the region between Russia, USA and Europe (EU).

In the center of Eurasia, the space between the European Union, which is in an unprecedented process of enlargement, and China, which is evolving towards regional and global supremacy, is in danger of remaining a geopolitical black hole until Russia solves its internal controversies about defining its post-imperial status.

Traditionally, in the last centuries, Russia has had two great problems: a) the permanent alienation between society and government, between social and political realms; b) the mentality of a fortress under siege, the idea that its security is greater as its neighbors are weaker and unsafe. Surpassing these two problems is essential both for Russia’s very destiny as well as for its relation with the world; that is for defining its future role in the context of globalization.

These two problems are accompanied by three major challenges, which should be addressed gradually, that are: a) the capacity of building institutions able of a coherent administration of its entire present territory (which threatens to decompose due to the separatist tendencies of some of the federation’s subjects, and the attitude of chaotic, anarchic and disobedient autonomization of some of the Russian regions, as well as due to the slow pace occupation of the far eastern regions by massive migratory fluxes coming especially from China, or to the Islamic fundamentalism and the organized crime in the south of the country); b) the capacity of identifying new cohesion criteria (post-Soviet, post-pan Slavic and post-pan orthodox) capable to direct the loyalty of the citizens towards the Federation and, thus, to insure the reliability of the Federation itself (Russia must become a real Federation, functioning in accordance with the values and principles of democracy and the rule of law, of transparency and accountability, capable of better reacting to the needs for security, freedom, dignity – including the cultural identity ones – and prosperity of its citizens than any other state organization formulas); c) the capacity of achieving conciliation between the oligarchy (plutocracy) and state, which implies the integration of the black market in the state order and in the general social effort destined to maximize national security, as well as the achievement of a fair balance between option, risk and accountability. In similar terms, one should approach the problem of building the CIS (which will eventually restrain, probably, to the Russian Federation, the five Central Asian republics and, possibly to some Caucasus countries) as an authentic and reliable confederation, making the association with Russia to count for the rapid access to a superior civilization, for the avoidance of the fundamentalism’s and organized crime aggression’s dangers, for more security and more prosperity for the citizens of those states. The international social democracy must help the Russian Federation to follow such a road because only in this way it can play a constructive role within the globalization process by using its positive capabilities.

The last years’ evolutions indicate the fact that Russia stopped being the strategic enemy of the free Euro-Atlantic world. President Putin seems to have understood that the security and the prosperity of his huge country depends, in the context of the new opportunities and threats brought about by globalization, on cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic democracies, as well as on the reinstatement of the bond between the Russian society and the political power of the Russian state, bond which had been broken since the first centuries of the last millennium.

The Russian political elite must be conscious that Russia’s top priority is its own modernization, rather than the effort to regain its world power status. If the integration or reintegration process of West European structures and values in the Russian society – process which was initiated many times in Russians’ history, but was never finalized – is this time fulfilled, Russia will be able to turn from a non-enemy (which it objectively is, nowadays) into an ally (which it has the vocation to become). Until then it remains in the uncomfortable for all situation to be either a "companion" whose preference for force methods instead of political and economic solutions to solve internal crises as the Chechen one, are mistakenly overlooked, for the sake of the alliance against global terrorism, or a business partner which must be always under surveillance.

In order that Russia becomes a positive center of power in the context of globalization, it must be democratic and prosperous. To this purpose it is necessary that the other countries apply a strategy in three points in the relations with Russia, as follows: a) to consolidate Russia’s geostrategic security by consolidating stability and security of small and medium size states in its close vicinity; those states would become a bridge between Russia and the European and Euro-Atlantic space, thus creating the lack of necessity for new buffer zones;

b) to contribute to Russia’s economic development through adequate assistance and investment programs, including the consolidation and opening of the markets in its vicinity;

c) to include Russia in a regional and global co-decision system on the basis of a special partnership with the European, Euro-Atlantic, Pan-Asian and global integrated organizations.

Russia’s role in insuring international stability is very important in the fields of:

• The control over mass-destruction weapons (nuclear, chemical or bacteriologic) as well as over their production technology. The greatest risk for the global security, resulting from the physical and moral decay of the former Soviet Union and the Red Army, is represented by the fission material trafficking. The threat is ever greater, taking into account that the size of this market and the role the organized crime elements play could not yet be established. Probably, it is bigger than we imagine. To this one should add the danger represented by the migration of the today unemployed former Soviet scientists who are experts in the field of the nuclear, chemical or biologic technologies.

• The containment of the organized crime, drugs and human beings trafficking. The arsenal means used by criminal organizations is especially varied, starting with drugs trafficking, which was and remains their predominant activity and financial backbone, weapons trafficking and ending with credit cards faking or illegal money transfers through the Internet.

• The ever-greater phenomenon of international migration, already reaching tens of millions, which entails the risk of ethnic and social conflicts transcontinental spread. A powerful and democratic Russia can keep under control such a phenomenon, also contributing to the insurance of a right balance between the free movement of persons and the offering a decent perspective for freedom, security and prosperity in their own country for each people in its vicinity. (Russia must not be turned, though, in a stronghold of the European Christendom to protect through Orthodoxy, western Catholicism and Protestantism against the Islam. On the contrary, it should be a bridge between Asian Islam and European Christianity, within the context of a real security given by liberalism and multiculturalism/multicultural dialogue).

In a globalized world Russia would be not only a "buffer-zone" for the Asian origin migration, but also a distinct source of emigration. Taking into account the fact that the fertility rate in Russia is bigger than in Western and Central Europe, as well as that the level of education in Russia is high, it can be anticipated that this country will play an important part in the achievement of the demographic balances in the European and Eurasian areas.

When speaking about the future presence of Russia in a globalized world one must also think to the massive Russian capital exports in the European Union and USA. This is the aggregated result of the transformation – in a licit but also in an illicit way – of the old overcapitalized Soviet type industry in liquidities, through the post-Soviet privatization process, as well as of the need to invest in secure places the income resulted from the massive selling of the Russian’s important natural resources.

The global world would undoubtedly be a polycentric world. The respective centers will not primarily be centers of military power, but of economic and cultural power. Each of them will try, of course, to promote its own political agenda. For the global peace, security and stability, it will be essential that among the centers of power a balance be established, so that they will integrate in a coherent action. In the context of the political and social environment changes, such a balance will be a dynamic one and it will imply variable geometry associations. From such a perspective, it is expected that a powerful Russia (with the rank of regional power) would intervene, on the one hand, to insure the balance between global superpowers, which will be USA and China, and, on the other hand, to insure the balance between USA and Europe (making possible for the Europeans and desirable for the Americans the continuation of the US involvement in Europe and the maintenance of the US status of "European power").

In a globalized world Russia will have – due to its geographical setting along some great energy resources routes, as well as its rich reserves of hydrocarbons and basic products – a role of regulating factor in insuring the balance on the oil, natural gas and other strategic products’ market, as well as in insuring the world’s energy security (including the diversification of the sources and transportation means). In order that such a role is played in a positive manner, it will be indispensable that Russian democracy consolidates itself, that the role of the oligarchies in the Russian economy is drastically reduced and the Russian state is associated to the global governance systems.

The vanishing of the Soviet Union’s imperial structure left Central Asia and the Caucasus with a power vacuum. Russia is (and, probably, will remain) too weak to regain its imperial domination over the region, but is strong enough not to be excluded from the regional equation. Turkey and Iran are powerful enough to be influential, but their internal political vulnerabilities makes them unfit to deal with Russian challenges and the internal conflicts in the region. China is powerful enough to be a major actor in the area, but is still in search of a global identity. Nevertheless, one has all the necessary elements to anticipate that this country will become a superpower capable of entering a balancing relation with the American superpower. Consequently, the Sino-American relation (a relation between two superpowers – maybe, the superpowers and, probably, the most important) will determine – at least decisively – the global security model. Therefore, it is desirable that the relation is not a tense and conflicting one. In order to avoid the specific tensions aroused by the bipolar systems, the inclusion of a third actor in the game will be useful. To insure geopolitical stability, this situation calls for the design of a balance of power mechanism between Russia, Turkey, Iran and China, as well as between China and the USA. The resolution of the regional problems will thus take place based on the "neither domination, nor exclusion" principle.

The United States and the European Union will also have to cooperate with all these regional actors so that: a) none of them achieves the status of a hegemon; b) to guarantee the free access to the region’s energy resources; c) the international investments in the Caspian-Central-Asian area determine the consolidation of the region’s new states’ independence and the establishment of a stability and security feeling in the region, reducing the risks of Balkan type conflicts.

The achievement of the security and stability objectives in Eurasia, as well as the transformation of Eurasia in a center of power capable of participating with a positive contribution to the insurance of the global equilibrium and the functioning of the new world order, depend not only on the evolution of the Russian Federation, but also on the extent to which it will know to mobilize the energy and the political will of some of the former Soviet republics to form a democratic and efficient Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) born out of the mutual trust and the openly expressed option of the participants. In this sense, CIS will have to be organized upon confederative bases, approximately according to the present model of the European Union. Only such a CIS will be able to play the role of a political and economic health pole and of a balancing factor in the multi-polar globalism. The ultimate condition is that this confederation is organized and functions according to democratic standards.

A CIS organized in such a way will be necessary in order to reach, at the global level, a system of check and balances together with the USA and China (and, maybe, even Japan), on one hand, and together with Europe and the United States, on the other. If such a course cannot be followed, the present CIS will either disintegrate (more or less gradually), or it will be affected by permanent internal tensions whose resolution will be attempted under the well-known model of exporting the unsettled disputes, thus becoming sources of contagious insecurity.

The threat for Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova is to remain political and economic "dangerous neighbors". For the time being, these two states are potential spreaders of asymmetric risks (organized crime, illegal emigration).

The consolidation of a sovereign Ukraine, defining itself as a Central European state and, at the same time engaging in a closer cooperation with the European Union, may also be a necessity for the insurance of a geopolitical pluralism in Eurasia. Obviously, Ukraine is, from the point of view of its vocation, a border state, a natural bridge situated with one leg in the EU and the other in the CIS. Eventually, an option will be, nevertheless, necessary. If Ukraine fulfilled the EU accession criteria, its presence as a flank country of the united Europe will be extremely useful. Presently, though, Ukraine’s remaining in the CIS and, consequently, in a "friendly neighborhood" of the EU, seems to be more likely. This would not be a problem if the CIS were a democratic and prosperous confederation.

The Republic of Moldova must consolidate its state independence regarding the Russian Federation; rediscover and consolidate its own cultural identity; develop the institutions and mechanisms of free market economy; guarantee the respect for human rights and fundamental liberties, so that it materializes the possibility of its integration into the European Union. Despite its temporary political and consciousness confusion, due to its historical past, its geographical location and the contents of its (Latin) culture, the Republic of Moldova is, unquestionably, a part of Europe and not of Eurasia. Therefore, its future must be envisioned exclusively in the EU.

Belarus is a special case mainly for two reasons: a) the authoritarian type of Lukashenko’s political regime, and b) the close relations with the Russian Federation (facilitated by the fact that, during their entire history, the Byelorussians didn’t have major reasons to accumulate hate attitudes towards the Russians, whom they consider the members of the same cultural family).

Belarus does not insure the minimum democratic standards by free elections and economic reforms. The human rights are systematically violated. Economic attractiveness is very low due to the aggressive behavior towards the Western firms and representatives.

Even though there are no serious risks of ethnic conflicts in Belarus, the EU enlargement towards the east, makes the Minsk regime a dangerous neighbor.

Despite these negative factors, some elements testify for the European vocation of Belarus. These are especially: a) geography, that places Belarus in Central Europe, or, at least, at the western extremity of Eastern Europe, and not in Eurasia; b) the ethnic, cultural and religious composition of the population, which includes an important Polish community, mostly Catholic; c) the high level of education of the population, following a process of industrialization which was the highest in the former Soviet Union.

The hardship in the relation with Belarus arises not only from the dictatorial feature of the Lukashenko regime, but also because Belarus is completely ignored or isolated in the international relations. Filling the strategic vacuum arisen from this exclusion is necessary, in order to use the chances of Europeanization or the European vocation of the Byelorussians, which are presently ignored. The support for an emerging democratic opposition and the consolidation of the civil society in Belarus are parts of a much-needed strategy in this respect. Also, the democratization of Belarus and the consolidation of a real independence that would allow it to freely choose Europe and the integration in the EU, should be regarded as a part of a coherent problem (together with the Transdniestrian problem, Crimea’s secessionism, the Abkhaz and Southern-Ossetian crises, as well as the frozen conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh) whose object is the post-imperial status of Russia and dealing with the Soviet inheritance. The coherent feature of the problem requires a coherent resolution. Such a resolution could not be found but in the context of establishing the role of Russia and the CIS within the new global order, of defining their participation to the global governance.